The United States has opened an aggressive new front in tariff policy, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2411(b), to target roughly 60 economies over their alleged failure to enforce prohibitions on goods made with forced labor. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative initiated the investigation under docket USTR-2026-0266 on March 12, 2026, and held a three-day public hearing from July 7 to 9, 2026. Proposed duties range from 10 percent to 12.5 percent.
The legal theory is what makes this action notable. Forced-labor import enforcement has traditionally proceeded under 19 U.S.C. 1307 and CBP Withhold Release Orders, which stop specific tainted merchandise at entry. This action instead treats a trading partner's inadequate enforcement of forced-labor prohibitions as an unreasonable act, policy, or practice that burdens U.S. commerce under Section 2411(b). It targets the foreign regulatory regime rather than particular goods, and it exposes entire tariff schedules rather than only implicated products. That is a materially different mechanism, and it raises the stakes on country-of-origin diligence for importers.
The proposed duties follow a two-tier structure. Economies that already maintain a forced-labor import prohibition, operate a partial regime, or have committed to action under an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade would face a 10 percent duty. All other investigated economies would face 12.5 percent. Annex A excludes certain items, and a textile mechanism would allow a limited volume of apparel and textile imports from certain economies at a lower rate, a carve-out of particular relevance to apparel-heavy Central American economies.
Several trading partners appeared before USTR to seek exemptions. A South African delegation contested the proposed 12.5 percent tariff, arguing that it has ratified key ILO conventions, maintains legislation to block forced-labor imports, and already prohibits prison-labor goods; it sought carve-outs for platinum group metals, vehicles, citrus, seafood, wine, and nuts. Peru, Guatemala, and Ecuador raised parallel arguments. Ecuador and Guatemala fall within the 10 percent tier, while Peru is in the 12.5 percent tier. USTR left the record open for written submissions through July 9, 2026, placing the matter at the decision stage.
The most significant vulnerability is the allegation that the action is a repackaged global tariff regime rather than a genuine forced-labor measure. In a July 8 letter, Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden urged U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to abandon the effort, arguing that the investigation is an attempt to reconstruct the global tariff regime struck down in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. That earlier regime rested on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the pivot to Section 301 represents a deliberate change of statutory authority intended to insulate the tariffs from the constitutional defect the court identified.
Wyden's strongest evidentiary point is the rate structure itself. USTR proposed identical rates for nations with the worst forced-labor records and for long-cooperative partners, which suggests that the forced-labor rationale may be a pretext for across-the-board tariffs. A Section 301 action must rest on a determination that a practice is unreasonable or discriminatory under Section 2411(b), and courts may review whether USTR's determination is arbitrary or exceeds its statutory authority. If the rates prove untethered from the stated findings, importers and foreign governments would have an Administrative Procedure Act and ultra vires challenge available at the Court of International Trade.